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4
Understanding the Major Threats 
to China’s Economic Growth 
Wing Thye Woo
University of California, Davis 
and Sunway University
Predictions of gloom and doom for China have a long tradition 
among economists. In the mid-1990s, Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics started highlighting the de facto 
insolvency of the Chinese banking system with the implication that 
a bank run leading to fi nancial sector collapse (which would then be 
likely to send the economy into a tailspin) was a strong possibility in the 
medium term.1 The twenty-fi rst century began with the claim by Gor-
don Chang (2001) that China’s imminent accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) would cause such widespread unemployment 
within China’s already alienated population that China’s economic and 
political systems would collapse.
These two dire predictions have turned out to be wrong. China, in 
fact, accelerated its annual GDP growth to double-digit rates after 2001. 
Nicholas Lardy was wrong because while the banks were indeed bank-
rupt, the Chinese government, which owned them, was not and could 
hence aff ord to bail out the banks when necessary. The fi scal strength of 
the government made it irrational for depositors to contemplate a bank 
run. Gordon Chang was wrong because the WTO membership quick-
ened the pace of job creation in China by greatly increasing the volume 
of foreign direct investment infl ow. The WTO membership made China 
more attractive to foreign direct investment because it guaranteed the 
access of Chinese goods to the U.S. market by eliminating the need for 
China to get the most-favored-nation (MFN) status annually from the 
U.S. Congress (McKibbin and Woo 2003).
The literature on China’s future growth became pessimistic again 
in the mid-2000s. One of the most astute analysts in China, Minxin Pei 
up18whiocrch4.indd   43 3/8/2018   9:32:00 AM
44   Woo
(2006), argues that China is now in a trapped transition that is described 
as “a transformative phase in which half-fi nished reforms have trans-
ferred power to new, affl  uent elites” who are using crony capitalism to 
generate high economic growth that is not sustainable. He believes that 
meaningful reform to ensure continued high growth is improbable.2
Pei’s pessimism about the inevitable exhaustion of China’s growth 
momentum has been shared by another leading China scholar, Yasheng 
Huang (2008). In Huang’s contrarian assessment, China in 1999 was 
actually less capitalistic than China in 1989. He asserted that the admin-
istration of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, which ended in March 2003, 
had reversed the march toward capitalism by systematically promoting 
the growth of large state-owned fi rms in the urban areas and suppress-
ing the activities of the privately owned small and medium fi rms in the 
countryside. Huang has attributed the deterioration in income distribu-
tion across classes and across regions to this reoccupation of the com-
manding heights of the economy by state-controlled companies (often 
in cahoots with foreign private companies), and the intensifi cation 
of discrimination against the domestic private fi rms. Because Huang 
believes (very reasonably, based on international experience) that the 
state-controlled fi rms are intrinsically less innovative than the domestic 
private fi rms, he concludes that China will be unable to move on to 
the next stage of economic development in the near future (at least not 
before India does so).3
THE ROUGH ROAD TO PROSPERITY 
China’s economy has been like a speeding car—in just 30 years, 
China has gone from one of the world’s poorest countries to the second-
largest economy. It is not surprising, then, to hear more glowingly 
optimistic assessments of China’s future than dismissively pessimistic 
ones. For example, O’Neill et al. (2005) of Goldman Sachs predict that 
China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States in 2040 even after 
assuming that China’s GDP growth rate will slow down steadily from 
its annual average of 10 percent in the 1979–2005 period to 3.8 percent 
in the 2030–2040 period.4 
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A good guide on how one should regard the competing optimistic 
and pessimistic literature is found in the discussions of the Sixth Ple-
num of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) that concluded on October 11, 2006. The Sixth Plenum 
passed a resolution to commit the CPC to establish a harmonious soci-
ety by 2020. The obvious implication from this commitment is that the 
major social, economic, and political trends within China might not 
lead to a harmonious society or, at least not fast enough.
Among the disharmonious features mentioned in the fi fth paragraph 
of the “resolutions of the CPC Central Committee on major issues 
regarding the building of a harmonious socialist society” were the seri-
ous imbalance in the social and economic development across (and 
within each of) China’s 31 provinces, worsening population and envi-
ronmental problems, grossly inadequate social safety nets and medical 
care system, and serious corruption. The harmonious socialist society 
proposed by the Sixth Plenum would encompass a democratic society 
under the rule of law; a society based on equality and justice; an honest 
and caring society; a stable, vigorous, and orderly society; and a society 
in which humans live in harmony with nature.
What is the origin of the CPC’s decision to change its primary 
focus from “economic construction” to “social harmony”? And why 
include a target date of 2020? I believe that this switch in emphasis 
from “economic construction” to “social harmony” occurs because the 
Hu-Wen leadership understands that the political legitimacy of CPC 
rule rests largely on maintaining an economic growth rate that is high 
enough to keep unemployment low, and also a growth pattern that dif-
fuses the additional income widely enough. Specifi cally, the Hu-Wen 
leadership recognizes that without accelerated institutional reforms and 
new major policy initiatives on a broad front, the 1978–2005 policy 
framework, which had produced an average annual GDP growth rate 
of almost 10 percent, is at odds with environmental sustainability and 
with international concerns about China’s persistent trade imbalances. 
More importantly, unless their new policies could produce signifi cant 
improvements in social harmony by 2020, social instability would 
reduce China’s economic growth and thus make the leadership of CPC 
in Chinese politics unsustainable.
Returning to the analogy of China’s economy being like a speeding 
car, the Hu-Wen leadership saw that the car could crash because there 
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were three high-probability failures that might occur and cause an eco-
nomic collapse: 1) hardware failure, 2) software failure, and 3) power 
supply failure. 
A hardware failure refers to the breakdown of an economic mecha-
nism, a development that is analogous to the collapse of the chassis of 
the car. Probable hardware failures include a banking crisis that causes 
a credit crunch that, in turn, dislocates production economy-wide, and a 
budget crisis that necessitates reductions in important infrastructure and 
social expenditure (and possibly generates high infl ation and balance of 
payments diffi  culties as well).
A software failure refers to a fl aw in governance that creates fre-
quent widespread social disorders that disrupt production economy-
wide and discourage private investment. This situation is like a car 
crash that resulted from a fi ght among the people inside the speeding 
car. Software failures could come from the present high-growth strat-
egy creating so much inequality and corruption that it generates severe 
social unrest, which dislocates economic activities, and from the state 
not being responsive enough to rising social expectations, hence caus-
ing social disorder.
A power supply failure refers to the economy being unable to move 
forward because it hits either a natural limit or an externally imposed 
limit—a situation that is akin, respectively, to the car running out of gas 
or to the car smashing into a barrier erected by an outsider. Examples 
of power supply failures are an environmental collapse, such as climate 
change or a collapse in China’s exports because of a trade war. In a 
sense, the repair of a power supply failure is more diffi  cult than either 
the repair of a hardware failure or the repair of a software failure because 
a large part of the repair has to be undertaken in collaboration with other 
countries. For example, the lowering of trade barriers requires China to 
negotiate with other countries, and the reversal of environmental dam-
age could require an advance in scientifi c understanding—an outcome 
that is more likely to occur when the entire scientifi c talent in China and 
the rest of the world is focused on the task. 
A discussion of the many events that could make China’s high 
growth unsustainable is beyond the scope of this chapter. This analysis 
will focus on one or two of the most likely precipitating events in each 
class of failures. The following section identifi es the weakening of Chi-
na’s fi scal position by nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the state banks 
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as the likely type of hardware failure that would occur. The next section 
discusses the outbreak of social disorder as the likely type of software 
failure. For power supply failures, the two most likely ones are the erec-
tion of trade barriers against China’s exports (discussed in the next three 
sections), and an environmental collapse, especially a shortage of water 
(discussed in the fi nal section). 
Hardware Failure
Among doomsayers, one favorite mechanism for the forthcoming 
collapse of an economy is the inevitable fi scal crisis of the state. It is 
noteworthy that this fi scal mechanism is used by doomsayers of all 
stripes. The Marxist economist James O’Connor (1973) predicted that 
the dynamics of capitalist America would precipitate a fi scal crisis that 
would destabilize the economy completely. In turn, the capitalist law-
yer Gordon Chang (2001) predicted that a fi scal crisis could trigger the 
event in the unavoidable disintegration of socialist China.
This fi xation on a large negative fi scal shock as a totally destruc-
tive systemic shock is understandable because fi scal imbalance is the 
proximate cause in most crises. The reason is that the state budget is 
often faced with the task of defusing the cumulative tensions unleashed 
by deeper, more fundamental social processes. To a fi rst approxima-
tion, fi scal capacity is a fundamental determinant of system stability 
because economic sustainability depends on the ability to cover produc-
tion costs, and political viability depends on the ability to reward one’s 
supporters and to pay off  one’s enemies. 
The reality in many cases is that fi scal sustainability is the prereq-
uisite for both economic sustainability and political viability, and that 
economic sustainability and political viability are intricately linked and 
mutually reinforcing. To see the mutual interdependence of the two, 
one only has to recall the many times that near-bankrupt governments 
have been driven out of power after raising the prices of a subsidized 
item like food, petrol, or foreign exchange.5 One could indeed go so 
far as to say that the degree of economic and political resilience of a 
state can be measured by the state’s ability to cover an unexpected, pro-
longed increase in expenditure or an unanticipated, protracted shortfall 
in revenue. 
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An OECD (2006) report has raised grave concerns about China’s 
fi scal management. 
China’s offi  cially reported spending fi gures refl ect only about three-
quarters of total government spending. Extra-budgetary spending, 
social security outlays and central government bond fi nancing of 
local projects are not part of the offi  cial budget. Notwithstanding 
recent reforms, the government remains overly exposed to extra-
budget and off -budget activities, which make public expenditures 
diffi  cult to plan and control and which impair their accountability 
and transparency. Contingent liabilities have been a major source 
of unplanned spending and pose perhaps the greatest risk to the 
controllability of future expenditure. (p. 10)
Fiscal sustainability is central to economic management. This can 
be seen in the two fi scal targets that the original Growth and Stability 
Pact of the countries in the eurozone specifi ed for its members to meet: 
1) the consolidated government budget defi cit should not exceed 3 per-
cent of GDP except in case of unusually severe downturn, and 2) the 
debt-GDP ratio should be brought down to 60 percent or lower.
The very aggressive fi scal-monetary policy mix undertaken by the 
government to combat the global fi nancial crisis that hit China at the 
end of the third quarter of 2008 has now created an NPL ratio that the 
investment house CLSA has put in the range of 15–19 percent, com-
pared to the offi  cial estimate of 1.6 percent. A recapitalization of the 
banking system is inevitable.
The important question is, how many more rounds of bank recapi-
talization can China aff ord without generating a fi scal crisis? The sim-
ple fact is that fi scal sustainability lies at the heart of whether a banking 
crisis would actually occur. As long as the state is perceived to be able 
and willing to bail out the state-owned banks (SOBs), depositors would 
retain their confi dence in the SOBs regardless of the actual state of their 
balance sheets. The current value of the debt-to-GDP ratio is not a good 
indicator of the sustainability of the existing fi scal policy regime; a bet-
ter indicator would involve working out the evolution of the debt-to-
GDP ratio over time.
To put the issue formally, the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio as 
given by
d (ln[Debt/GDP]) / d t = r + [GDP/Debt] × [f + b] – y 
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where
r = real interest rate on government debt
f  = primary fi scal defi cit rate [(state expenditure excluding debt service 
  – state revenue) / GDP]
b = NPL creation rate [(change in NPL in SOBs) / GDP]
y = trend growth rate of real GDP
As long as y > r, then the debt-to-GDP ratio will have a steady-state 
value that is nonzero when sum of (f + b) > 0. Specifi cally,
(Debt/GDP)steady-state = (f + b) / (y – r) when y > r
China appears to belong to this case because its post-1978 annual 
growth rate has averaged 9.4 percent, its growth rate in the next 10 years 
is likely to be above 8 percent; and the real interest rate has been about 
4 percent. For the generation of likely future scenarios, I will make the 
conservative assumptions that y is 8 percent, f is 1 percent, and r is 6 
percent.6 It is diffi  cult to predict b, the rate that banks would generate 
NPLs, because it depends on the type of banking reform undertaken. If 
no meaningful reforms are undertaken, then b is likely to remain at the 
historic value of 6 percent. 
So, conditional on the eff ectiveness of reforming the SOBs, the 
steady-state ratio is
 
(Debt/GDP)steady-state = 350 percent when b = 6 percent
(Debt/GDP)steady-state = 200 percent when b = 3 percent
(Debt/GDP)steady-state = 100 percent when b = 1 percent
The noteworthy fi nding from the above scenarios is that China will 
produce a level of (Debt/GDP)steady-state that is high by international expe-
rience despite the optimistic assumptions that long-run growth rate is 
8 percent, that b will be lowered from 6 percent of GDP to 1 percent. 
The most optimistic outcome is still two-thirds larger than what the 
European Union has set to be the “safe” debt-GDP target (60 percent) 
for its members. The banking system has made China vulnerable to a 
fi scal crisis, even though there is a theoretical steady-state level for the 
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debt-to-GDP ratio. Of course, the creation of NPLs cannot be attributed 
entirely to the SOBs; their chief customers, the embezzlement-ridden 
and ineffi  ciency-ridden state-owned enterprises (SOEs), deserve an 
equal share of the blame (see Woo [2001]; Woo et al. [1994]).
The important point from this second fi scal feature is that the pres-
ent ongoing recapitalization of the SOBs is the last time that the govern-
ment can aff ord to recapitalize the SOBs, and possibly the last time that 
the government can do so without upsetting confi dence in the fi nancial 
markets about the soundness of China’s fi scal regime. 
How diffi  cult is it to stop losses in the SOBs in order to ensure fi scal 
sustainability? The solution lies in imposing a hard budget constraint on 
the SOBs. SOB managers must be convinced that the present recapital-
ization is indeed the last free supper (which the 1998 recapitalization 
was announced to be), and that their compensation and promotion will 
depend only on the profi tability of the SOBs relative to the profi tability 
of private banks. 
At the same time, the prudential supervision and monitoring of bank 
operations will have to be strengthened to prevent asset stripping and 
discourage reckless investments fostered by the asymmetrical reward 
system under the soft budget constraint.7 The operations of SOBs could 
be further improved by bringing in foreign strategic investors who 
would be part of the management team, and by removing the infl uence 
of the local governments on bank operations.
Another way to harden the budget constraint faced by the SOBs 
is to privatize some of their branches and use the performance of the 
new private banks to gauge the performance of the remaining SOBs. 
The privatization of some branches will also help convince the SOB 
managers that the government is indeed serious about the present SOB 
recapitalization.
Software Failure
A successful market economy requires its regulatory institutions to 
have the prerequisite scientifi c understanding to determine whether a 
patent case involves real technological innovation. China’s strategy of 
incremental reform, combined with the fact that institution building is 
a time-consuming process, means that many of its regulatory institu-
tions are either absent or ineff ective. The results have been governance 
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failures on many fronts, of which the most well-known recent gover-
nance failures are the violations against the welfare of consumers and 
workers.
There have been signifi cant regulatory failures in keeping China’s 
food supply and pharmaceutical products safe. The misuse of chemi-
cals to lower production costs has resulted in the addition of poisonous 
substitutes into toothpaste (Barboza and Bogdanich 2007; Bogdanich 
2007), cough medicine (Bogdanich and Hooker 2007), and animal feed 
(Barboza 2007a; Barboza and Barrionuevo 2007); the application of 
lead paint to children’s toys (Barboza and Story 2007; Financial Times 
2007; Lipton and Barboza 2007);8 and the overemployment of antifun-
gals and antibacterials in fi sh farming (Barboza 2007b; Martin 2007a). 
Most of these abuses received enormous attention because these 
items were exported to other countries, and their harmful eff ects were 
reported widely in the international press.9 Clearly, Chinese consumers 
have been suff ering much more from such types of malfeasance, the 
scope of which has not been realized because of the considerable press 
censorship in China (Barboza 2007c). 
Dereliction in duty by government offi  cials is the fundamental rea-
son for such governance failures. The most well-known recent case was 
the conviction of Zheng Xiaoyu, the former director of China’s food and 
drug safety agency, for accepting bribes to approve production licenses 
for pharmaceutical companies and food companies. Such dereliction in 
offi  cial oversight has resulted in
tens of thousands of people [being] sickened or killed every year 
as a result of rampant counterfeiting of drugs, and tainted and sub-
standard food and drugs. For instance, last year 11 people died 
in China with an injection tainted by a poisonous chemical. Six 
people died and 80 others fell ill after taking an antibiotic that had 
been produced . . . with a substandard disinfectant. Small drug 
makers in China have long been accused of manufacturing phony 
or substandard drugs and marketing them to the nation’s hospitals 
and pharmaceutical companies. And mass poisonings involving 
tainted food products are common. (Barboza 2007d) 
There have also been signifi cant regulatory failures in the treat-
ment of labor, especially in the areas of occupational safety and wage 
payments. One of the most recent horrifying accounts involved forced 
labor of kidnapped children in the brick kilns of Shanxi and Henan 
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provinces (Buckley 2007; China Daily 2007). Reuters (2007) reports 
that “as many as 1,000 children may have been sold into slave labor in 
central China.” This deplorable aff air was exposed partly “because of 
an open letter posted online by a group of 400 fathers appealing for help 
in tracking missing sons they believed were sold to kiln boss” (New 
York Times 2007). A parent visiting the brick kilns in her quest to fi nd 
her son found that the local police were not only unwilling to help but 
also demanded bribes instead (French 2007). In one case, the brick kiln 
was owned by the son of the village Party secretary (New York Times 
2007). 
Perhaps, the two most dismaying revelations from the news reports 
on the brick kiln slavery are that this sad state of aff airs had been going 
on for a decade;10 and the “forced labor and sexual exploitation have 
increased as the trend in human traffi  cking in China has taken a turn 
for the worst” (Zhouqiong 2007). Yin Jianzhong, the senior offi  cial at 
the Ministry of Public Security who identifi ed the worsening trend in 
human traffi  cking in China, recognized a reason for the negative devel-
opment to be “the loopholes in the legal and labor systems. . . . [Spe-
cifi cally,] the Criminal Law on human traffi  cking protects women and 
children only and leaves out grown-up and teen males. It doesn’t have 
provisions for punishing those traffi  cking people for forced labor or 
prostitution” (Zhouqiong 2007). The fact that such legal loopholes exist 
supports our contention that the main cause behind the administrative 
failures in China is the “dereliction of duty by government offi  cials.”11
Inadequate institutions of governance are not the only cause of 
social tensions in China, however. The present economic development 
strategy, despite its ability to generate high growth, also generates high 
social tensions because, in the last 10 years, it has had great diffi  culty 
further reducing extreme poverty and signifi cantly improving the rural-
urban income distribution and the regional income distribution (see 
Démurger et al. [2002] and Woo et al. [2004]). In the fi rst half of the 
1990s, the $1.00 poverty rate (i.e., the proportion of rural population 
receiving a daily income of $1.00 or less) dropped rapidly from 31.3 
percent in 1990 to 15.0 percent in 1996. But as Figure 4.1 shows, in 
the following six years the decline was only 5 percentage points. The 
$1.00 poverty rate stayed in the 10–12 percent rate in the 1998–2003 
period, even though the GDP growth rate averaged 8.5 percent annu-
ally. It was only after the sustained large-scale eff ort to develop western 
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China began in 2001 and the post-2002 rise in the GDP growth rate to 
10 percent or higher that the $1.00 poverty rate dropped to 7.9 percent 
in 2004 and then to 7.2 percent in 2005.
However, the progress in poverty alleviation in the last decade is 
considerably much less impressive when the poverty line is lowered. 
The $0.75 poverty rate stayed unchanged from 1998 (4.6 percent) to 
2005 (4.2 percent); and the $0.50 poverty rate actually increased from 
1.9 percent in 1998 to 2.8 percent in 2005. In short, the higher growth 
rate in the 2003–2005 period did not cause income to trickle down to 
the poorest 5 percent of the rural population, and hence caused income 
inequality to worsen.
In the 1985–1987 period, China’s Gini coeffi  cient was below 0.3.12
According to a report in the offi  cial China Daily in 2005:
China’s income gap widened in the fi rst quarter of the year [2005], 
with 10 percent of the nation’s richest people enjoying 45 percent 
of the country’s wealth. . . . China’s poorest 10 percent had only 1.4 
percent of the nation’s wealth. . . . No precise Gini coeffi  cient was 
provided [by the state statistical agency], but state press reports in 
Figure 4.1  Proportion of Rural Population under Diff erent Specifi cations 
of the Poverty Line
NOTE: The 1990–1997 data are from World Bank (2001, Annex 1 Table 3), and the 








1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
$1 Poverty line $0.75 Poverty line $0.50 Poverty line
%
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recent weeks said the value was more than 0.48 and approaching 
0.5. . . . Most developed European nations tend to have coeffi  cients 
of between 0.24 and 0.36, while the United States has been above 
0.4 for several decades. (China Daily 2005)
The Asian Development Bank (2007) recently conducted a study 
of income inequality in 22 Asian countries over the 1992–2004 period. 
For 2004, only Nepal had a Gini coeffi  cient (47.30 percent) that was 
higher than China’s (47.25). However, in 2004, China’s income ratio 
of the richest 20 percent to the poorest 20 percent (11.37) was highest 
in Asia—signifi cantly higher than the next highest income ratio (9.47 
for Nepal). China is probably the most unequal country in Asia today. 
T able 4.1 presents the income inequality in China within the inter-
national context. China’s income inequality today is generally lower 
than in Latin America but generally higher than in Africa. The steady 
increase in China’s income inequality since 1985 raises the possibil-
ity that China is heading toward the Latin American degree of income 
inequality. 
The reason that doing more of the same economic policies in today’s 
China will not produce the same salubrious results of quick reduction 
in poverty and slow increase in inequality as in the early phases of eco-
nomic reform is because the development problems have changed. In 
the fi rst phase of economic development, the provision of more jobs 
(through economic deregulation) was enough to lower poverty signifi -
cantly. Many of the people who are still poor require more than just job 
opportunities; they fi rst need an infusion of assistance (e.g., empower-
ing them with human capital through education and health interven-
tions) in order to seize these job opportunities. Eff ective governance for 
equitable growth has now become even more challenging, and so the 
probability of improving social harmony has been diminished. 
Furthermore, the present mode of economic development gener-
ates immense opportunities for embezzlement of state assets, seizure 
of farmlands for industrial development, and corruption because of the 
absence of eff ective mechanisms to supervise government employees 
(see Woo [2001]). These features certainly make social harmony hard 
to sustain.
The data on social unrest are consistent with the hypothesis of ris-
ing social disharmony. First, the incidences of public disorder, or social 
incidents, have risen steadily from 8,700 in 1993 to 32,500 in 1999 and 
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then to 74,000 in 2004. Second, the average number of persons in a 
mass incident has also risen greatly, from 8 in 1993 to 50 in 2004.13 It 
should be noted, however, that these numbers might not accurately por-
tray the degree that social unrest has increased because the data include 
disco brawls and gambling den raids as well as social protests (see East-
SouthWestNorth [n.d.]). 
Clearly, the number of mass incidents would have been lower if 
China had better governance. There would have been more preemp-
tive eff orts at confl ict mediation by the government and less abuse of 
power if the government’s actions had been monitored closely by an 
independent mechanism and if the government had also been held more 
accountable for its performance. 
One main source of recent social unrest in rural China has been the 
conversion of farmland to industrial parks without adequate compensa-
tion to the farmers. It is interesting, therefore, that the No. 1 Document 
issued jointly in January 2006 by the CPC Central Committee and the 
State Council pledged not only to “stabilize and regulate the transfer 
of land-use rights and accelerate land acquisition reforms” but also to 
“expand channels to express public opinions in the countryside and 
improve the mechanism to resolve social confl icts” (Ma 2007b).14 
Table 4.1  China’s Income Inequality across Time and Space
Income ratio of
Gini coeffi  cients Top 20% Bottom 20%
Period Initial year Final year Initial year Final year
Nepal 1995–2003 37.65 47.30 6.19 9.47
China 1993–2004 40.74 47.25 7.57 11.37
India 1993–2004 32.89 36.22 4.85 5.52
Indonesia 1993–2002 34.37 34.30 5.20 5.13
Taipei, China 1993–2003 31.32 33.85 5.41 6.05
South Korea 1993–2004 28.68 31.55 4.38 5.47
Japan 1993 24.90 3.37
Columbia 2003 58.60 25.30
Brazil 2004 56.99 23.00
Côte d’Ivoire 2002 44.60 9.70
Nigeria 2003 43.60 9.80
United States 2000 39.42 8.45
United Kingdom 2002 34.37 5.59
SOURCE: Asian Development Bank (2007) and United Nations (2006).
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The Hu-Wen leadership’s desire to improve the institutions of gov-
ernance is also borne out by the following report from the South China 
Morning Post (Xiangwei 2007) about what Premier Wen said when he 
met a group of Chinese citizens in Japan in April 2007: 
During 30 minutes of impromptu remarks, he said the key to pur-
suing social justice, the mainland’s most important task, was to 
“let people be masters of their houses and make every cadre under-
stand that power is invested in them by the people.” 
. . . Although he did not deviate from the offi  cial line and spoke 
informally on both occasions, Mr. Wen is known for being care-
ful about what he says, whether in prepared remarks or speaking 
off  the cuff . The fact that he highlighted, in the presence of Hong 
Kong and overseas journalists, the need for political reform is 
uncharacteristic and interesting, particularly in the context of the 
leadership reshuffl  e looming at the Communist Party’s 17th con-
gress later this year. 
There have been signs that the leadership under President Hu 
Jintao is under increasing pressure to undertake drastic political 
reforms to consolidate the party’s grip on power and stamp out 
widespread corruption.
While there are reasonable grounds for an analyst to doubt either 
the sincerity of Premier Wen’s words or his ability to act on them, the 
analyst cannot doubt that Premier Wen is at least aware that democ-
racy is one way to solve many of China’s problems of governance. The 
embrace of the Harmonious Society program by the Hu-Wen leadership 
reveals CPC’s acknowledgment that democracy, the rule of law, and a 
stable income distribution make up an indivisible combination that is 
necessary to ensure the social stability that will keep the economy on 
the high-growth path to catch up with the United States (a vision that 
acts as the bedrock of CPC’s legitimacy to rule).
Power Supply Failure
China’s emergence as a major trading nation has been accompanied 
by increasing confl icts with the European Union (EU) and the United 
States about China’s trading practices and its exchange rate policy. The 
dissatisfaction over trade with China is evident from the following two 
press reports:
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Peter Mandelson, the EU trade commissioner . . . called various 
aspects of China’s trade policy “illogical,” “indefensible” and 
“unacceptable” and accused [China] of doing nothing to rein in 
rampant counterfeiting. . . . Mr. Mandelson also refused to grant 
China market economy status . . . [because it has] fulfi lled [only] 
one of fi ve criteria.” (Bounds 2007)
After years of inconclusive skirmishing, trade tensions between 
the United States and China are about to intensify. . . . “We are 
competing not only with a country with low wages but with very 
high and heavy subsidies and a rigging of their currency . . .” says 
Rep. Sander Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the House trade sub-
committee. . . . “I hate the term trade war because it is always used 
when you try to get a fair break . . . ,” he says: “Sometimes pres-
sure works.” (Lynch 2007)
While the trade defi cit is many times identifi ed as the cause of the 
trade tension, the true cause is the ongoing large shift in the international 
division of labor that has been set in motion by the post-1990 accelera-
tion of globalization and by the continued fast pace of technological 
innovations. The next two sections argue that the trade tensions refl ect, 
one, the pains of structural adjustment in the United States because of 
its very inadequate social safety nets, and, two, the dysfunctional nature 
of China’s fi nancial system.
CAUSES OF TRADE PROTECTIONISM AGAINST CHINA
Defects in the U.S. Economy
It is not uncommon to encounter allegations that the bilateral U.S.-
China trade defi cit represented the export of unemployment from China 
to the United States, and that it lowered the wage for labor. These alle-
gations are not supported by the facts, however. Table 4.2 shows that 
the steady rise in the trade defi cit from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1996 to 
5.9 percent in 2006 was accompanied by a fall in the civilian unemploy-
ment rate from 5.4 percent in 1996 to 4.6 percent in 2006, and by a rise 
in the total compensation (measured in 2005 prices) received by a full-
time worker from $48,175 in 1996 to $55,703 in 2005.15
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What is fueling the resentment toward imports from China when 
the median U.S. worker is experiencing neither more unemployment 
nor lower compensation? The U.S. worker is feeling more insecure in 
the 2000s than in the 1980s because of faster turnover in employment. 
Globalization and technological innovations have required the worker 
to change jobs more often, and she fi nds that there are considerable 
costs associated with the job change because of the inadequacies in the 
U.S. social safety nets.
Table 4.2 documents the more frequent change in jobs by the declin-
ing trend in the length of the median job tenure for older male workers. 
The median job tenure for males in the
• 33–44 age group decreased from 7.0 years in 1987 to 5.1 years 
in 2006;
• 45–54 age group decreased from 11.8 years in 1987 to 8.1 years 
in 2006; and
• 55–64 age group decreased from 14.5 years in 1987 to 9.5 years 
in 2006.
In terms of social safety nets, Burtless (2005) reports that within the 
G-7 in 2004, only the United Kingdom has a less generous unemploy-
ment benefi ts scheme than the United States. An unemployed person in 
the United States received initial unemployment benefi ts that equaled 
53 percent of previous income compared to 78 percent in Germany, 76 
percent in Canada and France, 61 percent in Japan, 60 percent in Italy, 
and 46 percent in the United Kingdom. The duration of unemployment 
benefi ts was 6 months in the United States compared to 12 months 
in Germany, 9 months in Canada, 30 months in France, 10 months in 
Japan, and 6 months in Italy and the United Kingdom. 
There are two major factors behind the more frequent changes in 
jobs. The fi rst factor is globalization, especially the post-1990 integra-
tion of the labor force in the former Soviet Union, India, and China 
(SIC) into the international division of labor. Table 4.3 shows that the 
number of workers already engaged in the international division of 
labor in 1990 was 1,083 million, and the combined labor force of SIC 
was 1,232 million. The international division of labor in 1990 was cer-
tainly an unnatural one because half of the world’s workforce had been 
kept out of it by the SIC’s autarkic policies. 
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The economic isolation of the Soviet bloc started crumbling when 
the new noncommunist Solidarity government of Poland began the mar-
ketization and internationalization of the Polish economy on January 1, 
1990.16 For the Chinese elite, the end of the Soviet Union in August 
1991 confi rmed that there was no third way in the capitalism-versus-
socialism debate. In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping entrenched China fi rmly 
on the path of convergence to a private market economy.17 In 1991, 
India faced a balance of payments crisis, and it responded by going well 
beyond the administration of the standard corrective macroeconomic 
medicine of fi scal-monetary tightening and exchange rate devaluation 
into comprehensive adjustments of microeconomic incentives.
Table 4.2  Trade Balance, Unemployment Rate, Total Compensation for 
Labor, and Job Tenure in Selected Year
1987 1996 2000 2006
Trade defi cit as a percent of GDP 3.1 1.2 3.9 5.9
Unemployment rate (%) 6.2 5.4 4.0 4.6
Total compensation for a full-time 
equivalent employee (2005 $)
46,041 48,175 52,728 55,703a
Median tenure at job for male 
workers by age group (years)
33–44 7.0 6.1 5.3 5.1
45–54 11.8 10.1 9.5 8.1
55–64 14.5 10.5 10.2 9.5
NOTES: Trade defi cit and unemployment data are from the White House (2007). Data 
on compensation in real terms and 1987 data are from Burtless (2007). Data on aver-
age job tenure in 1996–2006 are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls
.gov/news.release/tenure.t01.htm.
a From 2005.
Tab le 4.3  Distribution of the Global Labor Force (millions)













1990 2,315 1,083 403 680 1,232 687 332 213
2000 2,672 1,289 438 851 1,383 764 405 214
SOURCE: Freeman (2004). Our fi gure for “Global total” in 2000 is diff erent from that 
in Freeman.
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A decade after the start of the deep integration of the SIC economies 
into the world economic system, the number of workers involved in the 
international economic system in 2000 had increased to 2,672 million 
(with 1,363 million workers from SIC); see Table 4.3. The Heckscher-
Ohlin model would predict that this doubling of the world labor, 
achieved by bringing in cheaper labor from SIC, would lower the rela-
tive price of the labor-intensive good and hence reduce the real wage 
in the industrialized country.18 Furthermore, the fact that U.S. capital 
could now move abroad to build production facilities in the SIC econo-
mies to service the U.S. market as well as third markets also gave glo-
balization another channel to lower the U.S. wage. 
However, the U.S. real wage has not fallen (Table 4.2). The reason is 
that the remarkably high U.S. productivity growth since the late 1980s 
(perhaps enabled in large part by the information and communications 
technology [ICT] revolution) prevented the real wage from declining. 
Furthermore, as the import competition is focused on the good that uses 
low-skilled labor intensively, the wage gap between low-skilled labor 
and high-skilled labor in the United States has widened. In short, the 
economic impact of globalization in the United States is therefore man-
ifested in a diminished labor share of GDP, rather than in a lower real 
wage, and in an increased dispersion in U.S. wages.
While the Heckscher-Ohlin model does provide a coherent mecha-
nism for globalization to have the above two wage outcomes, the incon-
venient truth is that China might not be the most infl uential factor in 
these developments even though China accounted for 764 million of the 
combined SIC labor force of 1,383 million in 2000. China is unlikely to 
be the most important culprit because there are three other independent 
developments that have had important consequences for U.S. wages. 
First, many technological innovations have substituted capital for 
labor and have transformed many of what have been traditionally non-
tradable services into tradable services, allowing jobs to be outsourced 
to foreign service providers. For example, the ICT revolution has 
allowed off shore call centers to handle questions from U.S. customers, 
off shore accountants to process U.S.-based transactions, and off shore 
medical technicians to read the X-rays of U.S. patients. The empirical 
literature suggests that technological innovations are likely to have had 
a bigger infl uence on U.S. wages than import competition from China.19
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Second, institutional changes have attenuated labor share of income. 
Union membership has declined, reducing the bargaining power of 
labor. There has also been an upward shift in the compensation norms 
for high-level executives. Third, there has been increased immigra-
tion into the United States (before 2001), especially a disproportionate 
inward immigration of low-skilled labor. 20
In short, much of the popular outcry in the United States and the 
European Union against China’s trade surpluses is misplaced. A wid-
ening of the U.S. trade defi cit creates additional stress on U.S. labor 
because U.S. imports are more labor-intensive than its exports. How-
ever, even if China’s trade balance were zero, the pains of structural 
adjustment and income redistribution caused by technological innova-
tions, institutional changes, globalization, and immigration would still 
be there; and the amount of worker anxiety they generated collectively 
would be much larger than the additional worker anxiety generated by 
the widening trade defi cit. 
If the United States strengthens its social safety nets to lower the 
cost of changing jobs, it could help reduce trade tensions between 
the United States and China. Specifi cally, the U.S. Congress should 
quicken the reduction in fi scal imbalance and expand trade adjustment 
programs, especially those that upgrade the skill of the younger work-
ers. The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program still functions 
inadequately after its overhaul in 2002. Brainard (2007) reports that
participation has remained surprisingly low, thanks in part to con-
fusing Department of Labor interpretations and practices that ulti-
mately deny benefi ts to roughly three-quarters of workers who are 
certifi ed as eligible for them. TAA has helped fewer than 75,000 
new workers per year, while denying more than 40 percent of all 
employers’ petitions. And remarkably, the Department of Labor 
has interpreted the TAA statute as excluding the growing num-
ber of services workers displaced by trade. . . . Between 2001 and 
2004, an average of only 64 percent of participants found jobs 
while they participated in TAA. And earnings on the new job were 
more than 20 percent below those prior to displacement.
The TAA program clearly needs further improvement. Brainard’s 
(2007) proposal for the establishment of wage insurance is an excellent 
way to bring the U.S. social safety net more in line with the type of struc-
tural adjustments driven by globalization and technological changes.
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DEFECTS IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY
China’s chronic and growing overall trade surplus reveals a deep-
seated serious problem in China’s economy, its dysfunctional fi nancial 
system. This problem is revealed by the aggregate-level accounting 
identity that the overall current account balance (of which, in China, 
the overall trade account is the biggest part) is determined by the fi scal 
position of the government, and the savings-investment decisions of the 
state-controlled enterprise (SCE) sector and the private sector, which 
together make up the nongovernment sector.21 Specifi cally,
CA = (T − G) + (SSCE − ISCE) + (Spri vate − Iprivate),
where CA = current account in the balance of payments.
CA = (X − M) + R
X = export of goods and nonfactor services
M = import of goods and nonfactor services
R = net factor earnings from abroad (i.e., export of factor services)
T = state revenue
G = state expenditure (including state investment)
SSCE = saving of the SCEs
ISCE = investment of the SCEs
Sprivate = saving of the private sector
Iprivate = investment of the private sector
The Chinese fi scal position (T − G) has for the last decade been 
a small defi cit, so it is not the cause of the swelling current account 
surpluses in the 2000s. The current account surplus exists because the 
sum of savings by SCEs and the private sector exceeds the sum of their 
investment expenditures. 
Why has China’s fi nancial system failed to translate the savings into 
investments? Such an outcome was not always the case. Before 1994, 
the voracious absorption of bank loans by SCEs to invest recklessly 
usually kept the current account negative and the creation of NPLs high. 
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When the government implemented stricter controls on the SOBs from 
1994 onward (e.g., removing top bank offi  cials whenever their bank 
lent more than its credit quota or allowed the NPL ratio to increase too 
rapidly), the SOBs slowed down the growth of loans to SCEs. This cut-
back created an excess of savings because the SOB-dominated fi nancial 
sector did not then rechannel the released savings (which were also 
increasing) to fi nance the investment of the private sector. This failure 
in fi nancial intermediation by the SOBs is quite understandable. First, 
the legal status of private enterprises was, until recently, lower than that 
of the state enterprises; and, second, there was no reliable way to assess 
the balance sheets of the private enterprises, which were naturally eager 
to escape taxation. The upshot was that the residual excess savings 
leaked abroad in the form of the current account surplus. Inadequate 
fi nancial intermediation has made developing China a capital-exporting 
country. 
This perverse current account outcome is not new. Taiwan had 
exactly this problem up to the mid-1980s, when all Taiwanese banks 
were state owned and operated according to the civil service regula-
tion that required loan offi  cers to repay any bad loans that they had 
approved. The result was a massive failure in fi nancial intermediation 
that caused Taiwan’s current account surplus to be 21 percent of GDP in 
1986. The reason China has not been producing the gargantuan current 
account surpluses seen in Taiwan in the mid-1980s is because of the 
large amount of SCE investments. 
Why is the nongovernment sector’s savings rate rising? The com-
bined savings of the SOE and non-SOE sectors rose from 20 percent in 
1978 to 30 percent in 1987, and then went above 45 percent since 2004. 
In discussions about the increasing savings rate, a common view is that 
the rise refl ects the uncertainty about the future that many SOE work-
ers feel in the face of widespread privatization of loss-making SOEs. 
This explanation is incomplete because there also has been a rise in the 
rural savings rate, even though rural residents have little to fear about 
the loss of jobs in the state-enterprise sector because none of them are 
employed there.22
We see two general changes that have caused both urban and rural 
savings rates to rise signifi cantly. The fi rst is increased worries about 
the future. The steady decline in state subsidies to medical care, hous-
ing, loss-making enterprises, and education, along with mismanage-
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ment of pension funds by the state, have led people to save more to 
insure against future bad luck (e.g., sickness, job loss), buy their own 
homes, build up nest eggs for retirement, and invest in their children.
The second change is the secular improvement in the offi  cial Chi-
nese attitude toward market capitalism. Given the high rate of return to 
capital, this increasingly business-friendly attitude of the Communist 
Party of China has encouraged both rural and urban residents to save 
for investment—that is, greater optimism about the future has spawned 
investment-motivated saving.23
In our explanations of the existence of the current account sur-
pluses and the growth of the surplus, there is a common element in 
both—China’s fi nancial system. The fact is that savings behavior is not 
independent of the sophistication of the fi nancial system. An advanced 
fi nancial system will have a variety of fi nancial institutions that would 
enable pooling of risks by providing medical insurance, pension insur-
ance, and unemployment insurance, and transform savings into educa-
tion loans, housing loans, and other types of investment loans to the 
private sector. Ceteris paribus, the more sophisticated a fi nancial sys-
tem, the lower the savings rate. China generates the current account 
surplus because of inadequate fi nancial intermediation, and the surplus 
grows over time because the dysfunctional fi nancial system fails to 
pool risks to reduce uncertainty-induced savings and fails to provide 
loans to reduce investment-motivated saving.
What is to be done in China? The obvious short-run policy package 
has two components. First, accelerate import liberalization (e.g., seri-
ously implement the commitments made in negotiations for WTO mem-
bership, such as IPR protection) and expand beyond WTO specifi cations. 
The second component of the short-run policy package is to have 
an expansionary fi scal policy (e.g., rural infrastructure investments) 
to soak up the excess savings, with an emphasis on import-intensive 
investments (e.g., buying airplanes and sending students abroad). It is 
important that time limits be put on the expanded public works and 
SCE investments because, in the long run, the increased public invest-
ments could follow an increasingly rent-seeking path that is wasteful 
(e.g., building a second big bridge to a lowly populated island to ben-
efi t a politically connected construction company, as in Japan), and the 
increased SCE investments could convert themselves into nonperform-
ing loans at the SOBs.
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Clearly, the optimum solution to the problem of excess saving is not 
for the government to absorb it by increasing its budget defi cit but to 
establish an improved mechanism for coordinating private savings and 
private investments. The establishment of a modern fi nancial system 
will not only achieve the objective of intermediating all of domestic 
saving into domestic investment; it will also enhance welfare and lower 
the savings rate by pooling risks through vehicles like medical insur-
ance and pension insurance. In a nutshell, China’s main challenge today 
is to develop smoothly functioning fi nancial, planning, and regulatory 
systems that can employ the remaining rural surplus labor (as indicated 
by an average wage of about $120 per month for 480 million rural and 
migrant workers) and surplus capital, which now shows up as China’s 
sustained current account surplus and rising foreign exchange reserves.
The important conclusion from this section is that U.S.-China trade 
tension would be lowered much more if both countries undertake cor-
rective policies rather than if China acted alone, and that a wider range 
of policy instruments should be employed (e.g., wage insurance pro-
gram in U.S. and fi nancial market development in China) rather than 
relying just on exchange rate adjustment alone. 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL COLLAPSE IN CHINA 
The present mode of economic development has given China 
the dirtiest air in the world, is polluting more and more of the water 
resources, and is possibly changing the climate pattern within China.24 
The reality is that CPC’s new objective of living in harmony with nature 
is not a choice because the Maoist adage of “man conquering nature” 
is just as unrealistic as creating prosperity through central planning. 
China’s fast growth in the last two decades has done substantial dam-
age to the environment. Economy (2004, pp. 18–19) summarizes the 
economic toll as follows:
China has become home to six of the ten most polluted cities in the 
world. Acid rain now aff ects about one-third of China’s territory, 
including approximately one-third of its farmland. More than 75 
percent of the water in rivers fl owing through China’s urban areas 
is [unsuitable for human contact] . . . deforestation and grassland 
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degradation continue largely unabated. . . . The [annual] economic 
cost of environmental degradation and pollution . . . are the equiva-
lent of 8–12 percent of China’s annual gross domestic product.
Water shortage appears to pose the most immediate environmental 
threat to China’s continued high growth. Presently, China uses 67–75 
percent of the 800–900 billion cubic meters of water available annu-
ally, and present trends in water consumption project the usage rate 
to be 78–100 percent in 2030 (Lee 2006). The present water situation 
is actually already fairly critical because of the uneven distribution of 
water and the lower than normal rainfall in the past 15 years. Right now, 
“[about] 400 of China’s 660 cities face water shortages, with 110 of 
them severely short” (Noi 2004).25
The extended period of semidrought in northern China combined 
with the economic and population growth have caused an increased 
amount of water to be pumped from the aquifers, leading the water table 
to drop three to six meters a year (Becker 2003; Ma 2003). And a study 
using measurements from satellites (the Global Positioning System) 
has established that the part of China north of the thirty-sixth parallel 
latitude has been “sinking at the rate of 2 millimeters a year” (Becker 
2003).26 Specifi cally, “Shanghai, Tianjin, and Taiyuan are the worst hit 
in China, with each sinking more than two meters (6.6 feet) since the 
early 1990s” (Agence France-Presse 2004). 
The overall water situation in northern China is refl ected in the fate 
of the Yellow River, “which started drying up every few years from 
1972, did so for increasing periods of time over longer distances in 
the 1990s until 1997, when it dried up for almost the entire year over a 
stretch of several hundred kilometres” Noi (2004).
The utilization rate of Yellow River’s water is 60 percent, far 
exceeding the internationally recommended utilization limit of 40 per-
cent. All the mentioned factors have contributed to lowering the “amount 
of Yellow River water feeding into the Bohai Sea” from an annual 49.6 
billion cubic meters in the 1960s to 14.2 billion cubic meters in the 
1990s to the present 4.65 billion cubic meters (Lee 2006). 
Water shortage and the increasing pollution of current water sup-
plies are not the only serious environmental threats to the economy of 
northern China.27 The desert is expanding (possibly at an accelerating 
pace), and human activities appear to be the chief culprit. The State For-
estry Administration reported that 28 percent of the country’s land mass 
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was aff ected by desertifi cation in 1999, and 37 percent was aff ected by 
soil erosion. The report identifi ed about 65 percent of the desert as hav-
ing been created by “overcultivation, overgrazing, deforestation, and 
poor irrigation practices” (South China Morning Post 2002). The rate 
of desertifi cation is 3,900 square miles a year, an annual loss of a land 
area twice the size of Delaware.28 One direct upshot is a great increase 
in the frequency of major sandstorms, which plays “havoc with avia-
tion in northern China for weeks, cripples high-tech manufacturing and 
worsens respiratory problems as far downstream as Japan, the Korean 
peninsula and even the western United States” (French 2004).29 In the 
assessment of Chen Lai, vice minister of water resources, “It will take 
nearly half a century for China to control the eroded land and reha-
bilitate their damaged ecosystems in accordance with China’s present 
erosion-control capabilities” (South China Morning Post 2002). 
While northern China has been getting drier and experiencing 
desertifi cation, nature, as if in compensation (or in mockery), has been 
blasting southern China with heavier rains, causing heavy fl oods that 
have brought considerable deaths and property damage almost every 
summer since 1998.30 The sad possibility is that the northern droughts 
and southern fl oods may not be independent events but a combination 
caused by pollution that originates in China. I will have more to say 
about this possibility later.
Clearly, without water, growth cannot endure. And in response, 
the government began implementation in 2002 of Mao Zedong’s 1952 
proposal that three canals—each over 1,000 miles long—be built to 
bring water from the south to the north: 1) an eastern coastal canal from 
Jiangsu to Shandong and Tianjin, 2) a central canal from Hubei to Bei-
jing and Tianjin, and 3) a western route from Tibet to the northwestern 
provinces (Phan 2002). Construction of the eastern canal (which would 
be built on a part of the existing Grand Canal) started in 2002, and 
the central canal in 2003. Work on the western canal was scheduled to 
begin in 2010 upon completion of the fi rst stage of the central canal. 
The scale of this water transfer project is simply unprecedented 
anywhere: “Together, the three channels would pump about 48 billion 
liters of water a year—enough to fi ll New York’s taps for a quarter cen-
tury. Only a tenth as much water fl ows through the next-largest water 
diversion project, in California” (Phan 2002).
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This massive construction project will not only be technically chal-
lenging but also extremely sensitive politically and fraught with envi-
ronmental risks. The central canal will have to tunnel through the foot 
of the huge dyke that contains the elevated Yellow River, and the west-
ern canal will have to transport water through regions susceptible to 
freezing. The number of people displaced by the Three Gorges Dam 
was 1.1 million, and this water transfer scheme is a bigger project. The 
enlargement of the Danjiangkou Dam (in Hubei) alone to enable it to 
be the source of the central canal will already displace 330,000 people 
(Cheung 2003).31 Moving people involuntarily is certainly potentially 
explosive politically. The project could also be politically explosive 
on the international front as well. One plan for the western canal calls 
for “damming the Brahmaputra river and diverting 200 billion cubic 
metres of water annually to feed the ageing Yellow River,” a scenario 
that is reportedly “giving sleepless nights to the Indian government . . . 
[which is concerned that this Great Western Water Diverson Project] 
could have immense impact on lower riparian states like India and Ban-
gladesh” (Bagchi 2006). 
The potential environmental damages caused by this project are the 
most serious for the central and western canals. In the case of the central 
canal, 
environmental experts [in Wuhan where the Hanjiang River fl ows 
into the Yangtze] are worried about . . . [whether the annual extrac-
tion of 8 billion cubic meters of water could aff ect] the river’s 
ability to fl ush out the massive pollution fl ows released by the 
thousands of factories and industries along the tributaries. . . . 
The reduced fl ows could increase the frequency of toxic red algae 
blooms on the Yangtze near the confl uence with the Hanjiang 
River. There have already been three blooms . . . [by May of that 
year, 2003]. (Cheung 2003)
The western canal has generated a lively controversy. Some scien-
tists are contending that it “would cause more ecological damage than 
good” (Oster 2006b) because it “could cause dramatic climate changes 
. . . [and] the changed fl ow and water temperature would lead to a rapid 
decline in fi sh and other aquatic species” (Simons 2006).
Many opponents of the water transfer project have argued that 
water conservation could go a long way toward addressing this problem 
because currently a tremendous amount of the water is wasted—only 
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50 percent of China’s industrial water is recycled compared to 80 per-
cent in the industrialized countries Noi (2004), and China consumes 
3,860 cubic meters of water to produce $10,000 of GDP compared to 
the world average of 965 cubic meters (Straits Times 2004). The most 
important reason for this ineffi  cient use of water lies in the fact that 
“China’s farmers, factories and householders enjoy some of the cheap-
est water in the world” (Holland 2006), even though China’s per capita 
endowment of water is a quarter of the world average (Straits Times 
2004). 
There is, however, the unhappy possibility that neither the price 
mechanism nor the three canals can solve China’s water problem and 
make its growth sustainable unless the present mode of economic 
development is drastically amended. There is now persuasive evidence 
that China’s voluminous emission of black carbon (particles of incom-
pletely combusted carbon) has contributed signifi cantly to a shift in the 
climate pattern that produces northern droughts and southern fl oods 
of increasing intensity (Menon et al. 2002; Streets 2005). The biggest 
source of what has been called the “Asian brown cloud” in the popular 
media is burning of coal and bio-fuels in China. If the pollution-induced 
climate change analysis is valid, it means that
• China’s massive reforestation program will not succeed in reduc-
ing sandstorms in the north because trees cannot survive if the 
amount of rainfall is declining over time; 
• the number of south-north canals will have to be increased over 
time to meet the demand for water in northern China; and
• China needs to signifi cantly reduce its emission of black carbon 
(presuming no new large emissions from neighboring countries 
like India).
The general point is that eff ective policy making on the environ-
mental front is a very diffi  cult task because much of the science about 
the problem is not known. For example, China must no longer separate 
its water and energy strategies. A systems approach in policy making 
is necessary because the interaction among the outcomes from the dif-
ferent sectoral policies can generate serious unintended environmen-
tal damage. If part of the shift in China’s climate is integral to global 
climate change, then a sustainable development policy would require 
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a complete rethinking about the location of population centers and 
types of enhanced international cooperation on global environmental 
management.
The uncomfortable reality for China is that unless ecological bal-
ance is restored within the medium term, environmental limits could 
choke off  further economic growth. And the uncomfortable reality for 
the rest of the world is that the negative consequences of large-scale 
environmental damage within a geographically large country are sel-
dom confi ned within that country’s borders. The continued march of 
China’s desertifi cation fi rst brought more frequent sandstorms to Bei-
jing and has sent yellow dust clouds not only across the sea to neigh-
boring Japan and Korea but also across the ocean to the United States. 
China’s environmental management is a concern not only for China’s 
welfare but for global welfare as well. 
In discussing the environmental aspects of the water transfer plan, 
it is important to note that there is now an open controversy in China 
involving a key government infrastructure project, and that this con-
troversy is not limited to members of the technocracy. The very public 
nature of the controversy and the involvement of more than just sci-
entists, engineers, and economists in it reveal how very far social atti-
tudes have progressed. The important point is that this change in social 
expectations will require any government in China to live in harmony 
with nature. However, any government will have great diffi  culties in 
doing so even if it wants to, because a green growth policy involves 
a systems approach, and scientifi c understanding of many ecological 
subsystems and the nature of their interactions is still rather incomplete. 
Proper management of the environment has now become critical 
for China if it is to continue its industrialization process. The unex-
purgated version of a 2007 World Bank reported that “about 750,000 
people die prematurely in China each year, mainly from air pollution 
in large cities” (McGregor 2007), and a 2007 OECD study estimates 
that “China’s air pollution will cause 20 million people a year to fall ill 
with respiratory diseases” (Anderlini 2007). Pan Yue, the deputy head 
of the State Environmental Protection Agency, summed up the present 
situation in China very well when he said, “If we continue on this path 
of traditional industrial civilization, there is no chance that we will have 
sustainable development. China’s population, resources, and environ-
ment have already reached the limits of their capacity to cope. Sustain-
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able development and new sources of energy are the only road that we 
can take” (Kynge 2004).
CONCLUSION 
In appraising whether the attainment of the October 2006 vision 
of a Harmonious Society would be suffi  cient to sustain high economic 
growth in China, the greatest inadequacy I see is the absence of a paral-
lel objective to build a harmonious world. A harmonious society cannot 
endure in China unless there is also a harmonious world, and vice versa. 
China’s pursuit of such a society requires it to actively help provide 
two global public goods that make a harmonious world possible: the 
strengthening of the multilateral free trade system and the protection of 
the global environmental commons.
China has benefi ted immensely from the GATT-WTO free-trade 
regime, and yet up to this point it has played a passive role in push-
ing the Doha Round negotiations forward to completion. By default, 
Brazil and India have assumed the leadership of the developing econo-
mies camp in the trade negotiations. According to Susan Schwab, the 
U.S. Trade Representative, at the G4 (United States, European Union, 
Brazil, and India) meeting in Potsdam in June 2007, Brazil and India 
retreated from their earlier off ers to reduce their manufacturing tariff s 
in return for cuts in agricultural subsidies by the developed economies 
because of “their fear of growing Chinese imports” (Beattie, Callan, 
and Pilling 2007; Luce and Callan 2007). The Brazilian-Indian action 
caused the Potsdam talks to fail and hurt the many developing econo-
mies that were agricultural exporters. 
China should now seek a leadership role in the Doha Round negoti-
ations that is commensurate with its participation in international trade. 
Failure of the Doha Round could set in motion the unraveling of mul-
tilateral free trade because the present international atmosphere is right 
for protectionism. The United States, which has traditionally been a 
leader in expanding the multilateral free trade system, is now beset by 
self-doubt for three major reasons. 
First, the United States was willing to endure the pains of struc-
tural adjustments in the 1960–1990 period to accommodate the grow-
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ing imports from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN because 
they were frontline allies in the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, 
it was natural for the United States to reconsider the economic cost of 
structural adjustment because the security and ideological benefi ts from 
it went down.
Second, the amount of required structural adjustment in the United 
States to accommodate the rise of the SIC bloc is far greater than the 
earlier adjustment to the rise of its Cold War allies. As noted, the entry 
of the former SIC economies has doubled the labor force participating 
in the international division of labor. 
Third, the strongest lobby for free trade in the United States has 
been the economics profession, and the free trade doctrine has come 
under strong internal criticism in the last few years. Paul Samuelson has 
made many fundamental contributions to the development of the stan-
dard trade models that convinced mainstream economists that free trade 
is the best policy, and it was therefore an intellectual earthquake when 
he argued in 2004 that under free trade, where outsourcing accelerates 
the transfer of knowledge to the developing country, there could be a 
decline in the welfare of the developed country (see Bernstein [2004] 
and Samuelson [2004]).  
While the veracity of the Samuelson hypothesis is uncertain, the 
hypothesis clearly refl ects the widespread pains of structural adjust-
ment that they witness around them—a phenomenon captured by the 
decreasing length of median job tenure. In April 2007, the United States 
bypassed multilateralism in free trade by agreeing to form a Free Trade 
Area with South Korea. With the United States weakening in its resolve 
to protect the multilateral free trade system, China should now become 
more active in the Doha Round negotiations to further deregulate world 
trade. Such a role will be very much in China’s interest because Brazil 
is now bypassing multilateral trade liberalization by entering into Free 
Trade Area negotiations with the European Union. The fact is that a 
growing number of nations like Brazil “are increasingly wary of a multi-
lateral deal because it would mandate tariff  cuts, exposing them more 
deeply to low-cost competition from China. Instead, they are seeking 
bilateral deals with rich countries that are tailored to the two parties’ 
needs” (Miller 2007). It is time for China to show that it is a responsible 
stakeholder by joining in the stewardship of the multilateral free trade 
system.
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The global environment is the second area where China can help to 
build a harmonious world system. Specifi cally, China should be mobi-
lizing international consensus to form an international research con-
sortium to develop ways to burn coal cleanly because China is now 
building a power station a week and is hence able to facilitate extensive 
experimentation on prototype plants to burn coal cleanly. If successful, 
this global cooperation on clean energy research will unleash sustain-
able development in China as well as the rest of the world.
We realize, of course, that while the need to maintain high growth 
could motivate China to become more active in supplying global public 
goods, it might not be allowed to do so because of the usual reluctance 
of the existing dominant powers to share the commanding heights of the 
world political leadership. The sad experience of Japan being denied 
permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations is 
a case in point. Harmonious international relations are the omitted item 
in China’s perception of a Harmonious Society in 2006, and it could 
turn out to be a very soft spot in the Chinese growth engine.
Besides the adept management of international relations, the com-
petent management of economic issues is also fundamental to maintain-
ing China’s path to high growth. The most important realization on this 
front is that in today’s China, doing more of the same economic policies 
will not produce the same salubrious results on every front because the 
development problems have changed. For example, in the fi rst phase of 
economic development, the provision of more jobs (through economic 
deregulation) was enough to lower poverty signifi cantly. Many of the 
people who are still poor require more than just job opportunities; they 
need an infusion of assistance (e.g., empower them with human capital 
through education and health interventions) in order to take advantage 
of these job opportunities. 
On the fi scal management front, my analysis suggests that the man-
agement of state assets and the regulation of the fi nancial sector should 
be reformed to eliminate the phenomenon of repeated recapitalization 
of the SOBs. The privatization of some units of the SOBs, and the emer-
gence of large domestic private banks will help strengthen the budget 
constraints perceived by the managers of SOBs.
The fact is, however, that the probability of a software failure and 
the probability of a power supply failure are both higher than the prob-
ability of a hardware failure. This means that development policy mak-
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ing in China has become more challenging. There must now not only be 
more adroit but also fuller accommodation of domestic social demands 
in order to keep China’s growth rate high. The reality is that popular 
satisfaction with the status quo depends inversely on the level of expec-
tations, and the expectations of the Chinese people toward their govern-
ment have risen dramatically along with income and, more importantly, 
along with their growing knowledge of the outside world. A Chinese 
government that consistently fails to produce results in line with the rise 
in social expectations runs the increasing risk of being challenged by 
another faction within the CPC, culminating in an open split with each 
side seeking the support of nonparty groups. 
Complicating matters is that there has not only been rising expecta-
tions but also diversifi cation of expectations. In this new situation, the 
greater use of democratic procedures, the establishment of an indepen-
dent judiciary, and the restoration of a free press might be inevitable 
if CPC is to successfully accommodate the rising social expectations 
and mediate the emerging diff erences in social expectations. What will 
happen will depend on whether the CPC is suffi  ciently confi dent that it 
will be politically skillful enough to lead the democratic transition and 
emerge afterward as the most important political force. History tells us 
that the French and British monarchies reacted very diff erently to the 
popular requests for reform, and the outcomes were very diff erent in 
each case. 
Notes
I was deeply honored to deliver this paper as the Werner Sichel Lecture at Western 
Michigan University on October 7, 2016. I am extremely grateful for the guidance I 
received in the discussion for revising the lecture. The insightful comments of Professor 
Huizhong Zhou and Professor Wei-Chiao Huang were most helpful.
  1. Lardy (1998) wrote that “China’s major banks are even weaker than most offi  cial 
data suggest. . . . On a realistic accounting, these banks’ capital adequacy is nega-
tive, and they are insolvent (p. 95). . . . The failure of China’s largest fi nancial 
institutions would disrupt the fl ow of credit and disrupt the payments system, lead-
ing to a collapse of economic activity. The failure of major banks also could have 
long-term implications for the household savings rate. . . . A lower savings rate 
would mean a lower rate of investment and slower growth, in turn depressing the 
rate of new job creation, leading to sustained higher levels of unemployment” (pp. 
143–144).
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  2. According to Pei (2006), “In a ‘trapped transition,’ the ruling elites have little 
interest in real reforms. They may pledge reforms, but most such pledges are lip 
service or tactical adjustments aimed at maintaining the status quo.” 
  3. As Huang (2006) sees that India does not discriminate against its indigenous capi-
talists in favor of foreign capitalists, he predicts that “[u]nless China embarks on 
bold institutional reforms, India may very well outperform it in the next 20 years.” 
  4. For a review of the debate on how to interpret China’s high growth in the 1978–
2000 and why China, unlike the economies of the former Soviet bloc, did not 
experience a recession when it made the switch from a centrally planned economy 
to a market economy, see Sachs and Woo (2000) and Woo (2001).
  5. For example, President Soeharto of Indonesia was pushed out of offi  ce in May 
1998, one month after raising fuel prices.
  6. f has been above 1.5 percent for the past seven years; r was 4 percent in the past 
only because the interest rate was regulated. I think that the implementation of 
fi nancial deregulation that is necessary for normal healthy development of the 
fi nancial sector will render r to be at least 6 percent because 1) according to Solow 
(1991), the stylized fact for the real interest rate in the United States is that it is 
5–6 percent; and 2) both the marginal rate of return to capital and the black market 
loan rate have been more than 20 percent. 
 7.  The asymmetry is from the absence of fi nancial punishment when a loss occurs. 
 8. Lipton and Barboza (2007) also report the recall of a ghoulish fake eyeball that 
was fi lled with kerosene, and of an infant wrist rattle that was a choking hazard.
 9. For example, radial tires were manufactured without the gum strips that prevented 
the tires from separating; see Martin (2007).
 10. This point was made by the popular tabloid Southern Metropolis Daily; see 
Buckley (2007).
 11. This point was made by the Shanxi governor, Yu Youjun, who said, “For a long 
time, relevant government departments did little to regulate rural workshops, 
small coal mines and small factories, and they are basically out of control and are 
not being supervised. . . . The dereliction of duty by civil servants and the corrup-
tion of individuals have made it possible for illegal labour to exist, particularly 
the abductions of migrant workers, and forced labour of children and mentally 
disabled people” (Ma 2007a). 
 12. The Gini coeffi  cient has a value between 0 and 1, and the higher the value, the 
greater the degree of income inequality. 
 13. The 1993 number is from Keidel (2006, p. 1), and the 2004 number is from Pei 
(2005), who wrote that, in 2004, there were 74,000 “mass incidents” involving 3.7 
million people compared to 10,000 such incidents involving 730,000 people in 
1994. Possibly, because of the widespread attention in the Western media on the 
marked rise in mass incidents, the post-2004 defi nition of mass incidents appeared 
to have been changed, making post-2004 data not comparable with the 1994–2004 
data; see discussion in EastSouthWestNorth (n.d.). 
 14. The No. 1 Document designation shows that this is the most important task in the 
new year.
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 15. This positive wage trend for the average worker is also seen in that for the average 
blue-collar worker; see Woo (2008).
 16. The economic transition and political disintegration of the Soviet bloc became 
irreversible when Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev as the unambiguous leader of Rus-
sia in August 1991 and implemented market-oriented reforms in January 1992. 
 17. Today, under the heading of a socialist market economy with Chinese characteris-
tics, the Chinese constitution gives private property the same legal status as public 
property, and the Chinese Communist Party accepts capitalists as members.
 18. More accurately, the wage of the formerly isolated SIC worker would rise while 
the wage for the worker in the industrialized country would fall.
 19. There is a large empirical literature on the relative impact of technological changes 
and globalization on the U.S. wage rate; see for example, Sachs and Shatz (1994) 
and Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
 20. Ottaviano and Peri (2005) off er a good discussion of this topic.
 21. The SCE category covers companies, which are classifi ed as SOBs, and joint-
venture and joint-stock companies, which are controlled by third parties (e.g., 
legal persons).
 22. Economist Intelligence Unit (2004, p. 23) reported that “farmers’ propensity to 
save seems to have increased.” 
 23. Liu and Woo (1994) and Woo and Liu (1995) contain formal modeling and econo-
metric support for the investment-motivated saving hypothesis.
 24. Air pollution is a serious problem. Of the 20 cities in the world identifi ed by the 
World Bank as having the dirtiest air, 16 of them are in China. It is shocking that 
lead and mercury poisoning are more common than expected. See Financial Times 
(2004) and Oster (2006a).
 25. The shortage is reported to be most acute in Taiyuan in Shanxi and Tianjin (Becker 
2003).
 26. Some 60 percent of the land in Tianjin municipality is plagued by subsistence 
(Becker 2003). 
 27. Examples of serious water pollution are Agence France-Presse (2006); Ma (2001); 
Straits Times (2003); Yardley (2004, 2006).  
 28. This is average of the 3,800 square miles reported in Howard (2004) and the 4,014 
square miles reported in the South China Morning Post (2002).
 29. The number of major sandstorms in China was 5 in the 1950–1959 period, 8 in 
1960–1969, 13 in 1970–1979, 14 in 1980–1989, 23 in 1990–1999, 14 in 2000, 26 
in 2001, 16 in 2002, and 11 in 2003, according to Pumin (2005). 
 30. The National Development and Reform Commission (2007) reported: “The 
regional distribution of precipitation shows that the decrease in annual precipita-
tion was signifi cant in most of northern China, eastern part of the northwest, and 
northeastern China, averaging 20~40 mm/10a, with decrease in northern China 
being most severe; while precipitation signifi cantly increased in southern China 
and southwestern China, averaging 20~60 mm/10a. . . . The frequency and inten-
sity of extreme climate/weather events throughout China have experienced obvi-
ous changes during the last 50 years. Drought in northern and northeastern China, 
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and fl ood in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River and southeastern 
China have become more severe.” 
 31.  A lower estimate of 300,000 is given in Eckholm (2002).
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